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ARTICLE
LOTS IN A NAME: WOULD "DILUTED"
MARKS STILL SELL AS SWEETLY?
Dev Saif Gangjee
Introduction (or Patience is a Virtue)
After a lengthy gestation period, the Trade Marks Act, 1999' entered into effect on September 15,
2003 with an almost unbecoming modesty,' replacing its veteran predecessor - the Trade and Merchandising Marks Act, 1958. Unlike the more controversial provisions of other recent intellectual
property legislations, such as the expansion of the patent system to include product patents for pharmaceuticals,i the Act has received a low-key yet largely favourable reception from both the press5 as
well as practitioners.' This arises from the general perception that the legislation has predominantly
evolved from a volitional desire to upgrade and rationalize the law rather than as a consequence of
onerous obligations imposed by the Agreement on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPS") and the Act has certainly introduced many welcome changes. Some of these include
an enlarged definition of a trademark,7 registration for service marks,' an increased term of registra
tion from seven to ten years,9 a single application for registration being permitted to cover different
classes of goods and services" and the establishment of an Intellectual Property Appellate Board to
hear appeals from the decisions of the Registrar."

Research associate, University of Oxford Intalectual Property Research Centre and former student, National Law
School of India University. I would like to acknowledge both the intellectual stimulation and financial support receivcd
from the people at Sarad <htrp://www.sarai.nut> in the preparation of this work. Critical insights about ontcllcrual
property on the "Commons Law" mailing list have served as the kernel for many of the thoughts expressed here.
(No 47 of 1999). (Hereinafter "the Act"').
The Gazette of India gideNotifcation No. SO. 1048(E) dated September 15, 2003.
(No. 43 of 1958). (Hereinafter "the 1958 Act").
This process was begin through Section 2 of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999 (No. 17 of 1999) which amended
Section 5 of the Patents Act, 1970 (No 39 of 1970).

See,latelkrAel Prspery Appellate Bond t he st s in Chmse, BUstNEss LINE, September 16, 2003; Guadin th 4ymbah
DreccraN HrLRtLD (Economy & Business Supplement), November 17, 2003.
t
See forexnampl, the Rery &Sagar News Update ltp //www.renfrycom/news.htn (visited on September 13, 2003);
NDA lnfatedb Upsdafe hrtp//wwanishitlhde~sai.coiinforech-uodate/NDA -lotline-iP-Sepr-t16-2003.htm (visited on
htr:://%vww.dsidegal.eom (visited on September 15,2003).
September 15,2003); DSK Lga/Ner Fs
This now includes the shape of goods, packaging and combinations of colours in Section 2(1)(2b) of the Act. The
definninon of "mar" has also been expanded, in Section 2(1)(n) of the Act.
"Service" is defined in Section 2(1)(z) of the Act and the classes of services are listed in Entry 35 to 42 of the Fourth
Schedule to the Trade Mark Rules, 2002.
The registration is also indefinitely renewable for additional periods of ten years under Section 25 of the Act.
A gencral principle of trademark law is that usualy rights in the mark are restricted to particular classes of goods which
are specified in the application for registraon. The new Oaw,as contained in Section 18(2) of the Act, is more
convenient than the earlier requirement of a separate application per dlass.
Seegeneral, Chapter XI of the Act.
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However, the purpose of this article is to highlight an understated but potentially revolutionary
change in the law regarding infringement of a registered trademark,1 which does not appear to have
received the attention it deserves. As part of a global shift in trademark jurisprudence towards stronger proprietary rights for trademark owners, the infringement provisions have been upgraded to include comparative advertising in certain "unfair competition" type situations" and also explicitly provide a remedy for situations where the infringement occurs through the use of a trade name or registration of a company name." Yet the most significant change has been the adoption of a particular
version of the concept of "dilution" in the new Act" and given the empirical fact that trademarks are
Lhe most litigated species of intellectual property in India, its unchecked development could have far
reaching consequences.
This article seeks to explore just why dilution - barming a mark by lessening its ability to distinguish
goods or services in the market - is such a radical departure from the traditional litmus test of
trademark infringement, namely consumer deception and confusion. While it cannot be
overemphasised that each case is ultimately decided on its own facts and circumstances," the sheer
novelty of this legislative intervention spurs the need for conceptual clarity and a ready roadmap of
principles when considering future cases. To that end the arguments will be structured along the
following lines - (a) an introduction to the concept of dilution; (b) an analysis of the Act's
infringement framework into which it has been incorporated to a qualified extent; (c) gaining
comparative insight from the United Kingdom's Trade Marks Act, 1994," which implemented the
European Community's Trademarks Directive' and which also is the inspiration for the present Act;
and finally (d) drawing on the Indian passing off" jurisprudence for the protection of well-known
marks, to see how far the conceptual foundations have already been laid in this regard. The article
concludes by advocating a qualified and cautious approach towards this new ground for infringemenr
as an overenthusiastic embrace could smother genuine competitive behaviour from horesE
compeutors.

through a combinaion of the registered trademark syster and the common
lIw tort of passing off. These two sysems are complementary and Section 27(2) of the Act preservcs the retmdy
o(f
passing off, which may be used in conunction with an infringement suit or Independenly where no registration
subsists
Valuable commercial names are protected

These are elucidated in Section 29(g) of the Act, as advertising which:(a) rakes unfair advantage of and is contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial atters, or
(b)us detrimental to is distincrive character, or
(c)is against the reputation of the trade mark.

According to Section 29(5) of the Act, "(a) registered trademark is infringed by a person if he uses such regitcred
trade mark, as his trade name or part of his trade name, or name of his business concern or part (if the name of his
business concern dealing in goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered."
Its specific contours are laid out in Section 29(4) of the Act.
Pr Pndad

v JP &

Ca. ALR. 1972 SC 1359, 1362.

(c 26 of 1994)
First Council Direcrive oF December 21, 1988
(89/ 14)

to

approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks

The traditional essence of passing off is dha no man is entitled to represent his goods or business as being the goods
or business of another whether such representation is made by the use ot any mark, name, sign or symbol, device ir
other means. Vee for nampk, Centg Traders
v. Rardanlal A.IR. 1978 Del. 250.
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Schechter's Legacy: The Concept of Trademark Dilution
The optimal starting point for an understanding of dilution is to pose the question - what is the
function of a trademark? Frank Schechter, often referred to as the father of dilution, believed that
the answer to that could no longer be found solely in the traditional notion of a mark indicating
"source or origin" of a product, but instead in the creation and retention of custom?. He believed
that the value of the mark lay in "its selling power".i A moment's reflection reveals that different
attitudes to trademark protection flow from each of these rationales. The former arose in the context
of industrial production and distribution channels separating producers and consumers. It seeks to
retain a link between the producer and consumer, focussing more on identifying the product and
guaranteeing its origin. It views the mark as making a representation of consistent quality - the
product is from company A and the consumer has either personal experience with or has beard of
the quality of A's products. The balance appears clearly weighted in favour of consumer protection.
The latter however emphasises the mark's advertising function; the mark as the cornerstone of a
"brand" -such a conceptualisation sees the mark as actually selling the product and so it has
independent value." One need only think of youthful fashion devotees spending large amounts to
wear clothing emblazoned prominently with logos like "Nike" or "Adidas", thus paying to be turned
into walking billboards? Such a basis acknowledges that marks generate a whole set of values and
associations with a product, which relate to lifestyle choices or how the consumer would like to
perceive of herself and have others perceive her. Thus Reid and Taylor Suitings invoke images of
Bond or Bachchan to reinforce associations of style, sophistication and good taste with their brand.
In such situations the proprietor has a clear interest in protecting this valuable commercial magnetism
which is associated with the brand and acknowledging dilution as a type of harm is the response to
this concern.
Schechter argued that unauthorised third party use of a strong or "singular" mark on non-competing
goods e.g, goods that were or would have been registered under a different class, would result in harm
even if no consumer was actually confused in the process. Speaking before a Congressional
4
Committee on Patents, he argued that:'
".. the person who has the trade-mark should be able to prevent other people from
vitiating the originality, the uniqueness of that mark. If you take Rolls Royce - for
instance, if you allow Rolls Royce restaurants and Rolls Royce cafeterias, and Rolls
Royce pants, and Rolls Royce candy, in 10 years you will not have the Rolls Royce
mark any more. That is the point."
His primary concern thus was the "gradual whittling away or dispersion of identity and hold upon the
public mind"," However, it must be noted at this juncture that Schechter was concerned with strong,
2 EL Schechuer, The Ratione/Basis of Tradmark Protection, 40 1ARY. L. Ray. 815, 822 (1926-27) (Hereinafter "Schechter").
21lbJar 83L
An account of the shift in thinking from the "origin" function to the "branding" function can be found in C1GPlaciANta, TRADE MARKs IN THEoRy AND PRJcnCE.
For a highIy critical perspective on such a function of trademarks, -oe, NAom KuaN, N Loco (2001),
itafringr before the House Cwmitke on Patits,72d Cong, 15 (1932) (statement of Frank Scheebter), quoted
The Prble of Trmhamark Diltionr and theAnti-Dilion Stamar, 44 CAL. Rv. 439, 449 (1956).
Schechter,

waprg note 20,

at 825
7
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reputed and "singular" marks i.e. the mark had to be visible enough to deserve this enhanced level of
protection. This is an important threshold requirement, which will be further explored in the
following sections of this article. Assuming that a mark is sufficiendy distinctive (either inherendy or
an acquired distincveness through use) and reputed, to warrant protection against dilution there are
two principal species of harms that have evolved through case lawm which would result in this
erosion of the unique selling power of a mark. These are:(a) Blurring
This concept has already been introduced by way of the Rolls Royce example above. in fact this
unease with gradual erosion is reflected clearly in the definition of dildution in the US federal law, as
the "lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,
regardless of the presence or absence of: 1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and
other parties, or 2) likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception."' However the common law
authority that is most often suggested as an appropriate example is the "Elderflower Champagne'
passing off decision," where French producers were successful in prohibiting the use of
"Charnpagne" on a non-alcoholic beverage. BinghamJ. reasoned that:
"The frst plaintiff's reputation and goodwill in the description Champagne derive
not only from the quality of their wine and its glamorous associations, but also
from the very singularity and exclusiveness of the description, the absence of
qualifying epithets and initative descriptions. Any product which is not
Champagne but which is allowed to describe itself as such must inevitably, in my
view, erode the singularity and exclusivity of the description Champagne and so
cause the first plainiFfs damage of an insidious but serious kind.""
This reasoning has been subsequently endorsed in broadly similar circumstances relating to Scotch
whisky, in the Indian courts"'
(b) Tarnishment
One of the most intuitve examples of this type of harm is found in the famous Dutch "ClaervnKlarein" case, where the well-known Claeryn trade mark for a type of gin evoked an image of clarity
and purity.3 The Benelux Court of Justice held that there was dilution under the Benelux Trade Mark

law when the defendant used a similar sounding trade mark for a cleaning product. As Megan
Richardson points out, while there was an element of preventing free-riding or the unfair
appropriation of a good reputation in this case, another reason was that the court possibly did not

in the US,, the most
rile urisdiction for dilution developments, attempts were made to stretch dilution thcory ito
addrcss cybersquaniag as well. This was reduced by the passage of the AntiCybersquatting Act of 1999. Je, 15 U.SC.
1125(d).
The Federal Tradenarik Dilution Act (15 USC. 1127), It was passed in 1995 and was added as 5 43(c) to the Lanham
An as of Januaon 16, 1996 (15 USC. 1125(c)).
ar .Ak | 19931 ES.R. 641. (Hereinafter "Tai/ngrv.AlI').

/Id at 678.
SIi/hernre/t

&les

Ltdv. M~iowelea
E(94 EilR. 690, 732.

Cokate 1Tdkohe 3W v.XN' KoninkAke Dirierdnen Erms tuat BolA [1979] E.CC. 4119.
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think it funny to drink a good glass of Claeryn Dutch gin while thinking of a cleaning agent at the
same time." Another example which vividly describes this principle is the early "4711" case from
Cologne, Germany where "the owner of the famous "4711" trademark for can de cologne got an
injunction against a manure collector who used his telephone number, 4711, painted in 20-inch high
numerals across both sides of his horse-drawn fertilizer wagon.!' This case should clearly put the
reader on the right scent.
Thus, these examples drawn from decided cases illustrate the type of harm that is sought to be
prevented. However, the Indian response to dilution prevention has been given a very specific shape
and form under the Act and it is to establish these boundaries that we must now turn our attention

The Bare Bones: A New Statutory Framework for Infringement
In order to appreciate the expansive scope of the new standards, an overview of the relevant
provisions of the 1958 Act is-hecessary. In a nutshell, the grounds for claiming infringement were
based on a likelihood of confusion and also limited to the specified class of registered goods." In dclinking the trade mark from its registered goods and services and doing away with the likelihood of
confusion requirement in certain situations, the new provisions appear to significantly extend the
proprietary rights of registered trade mark owners.' As regards the possibility of protecting a
registered mark used by alleged infringers on products not within the goods specified in the
registration, the proprietor was left to the vagaries of passing off with its significant evidential
burden. Within the registration regime, those who were tempted to register their mark for a wide
range of goods ran the risk of an application being made by a person aggrieved, to have the mark
removed from the register on the grounds that there had been no bona fide intention to use the mark
in respect of some or all of the goods or services, or alternatively, that there had been an
uninterrupted period of five years of non-use." The only other option was a limited blocking tactic; ,
defenrsive registration for well-known marks, in other classes of goods, which was excluded from
these use-related requirements. However as experience has shown, the problem with defensive
registration has been that the applicant bears the onus of establishing that the public would be likely
to suppose that the other goods for which the defensive application is made are connected in the
course of trade with the goods for which registration has already been obtained. Thus the possibilities
for protecting a mark across the spectrum of possible goods remained limited from within a
registered trademark perspective.
Under Section 29 of the new Act, infringement can be analytially categorised depending upon the
presence or absence of a confusion standard coupled with the degree of similarity of the marks and
the similarity between goods and services. Thus:
(1) The former test for infringement has been retained and Section 29(1) mirrors its predecessor.

2

M.

Richardson, Coppght in Trade Markr? On Understandng Trade Mark Diltion, INTELL. PROPtQ 66, 77 (20()())

1 Derenberg, The Probem ojfTrademark Dilution and theAnidilaon Staiues, 44 CAu. L. Ray. 439, 448 (1956)

Sec Section 29 of the 1958 Act.
See, Section 29 of the new Act.
See, Section 46 of the 1958 Act.
As per Sectioa 47 of the 1958 Act.
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"29. (1) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not being the
registered proprietor of the trade mark or a regstered user thereof using by way of
permitted use, uses in the course of trade a mark which is identical with, or
deceptively similar to, the trade mark, in relation to any goods or services in respect
of which the trade mark is registered and in such manner as to render the use of
the mark likely to be taken as being used as a trade mark."
Thus Section 29 envisages two possibilities. Where the two marks are identical and the allegedly
infringing goods' are the same as those specified in the registration, arriving at a conclusion of
infringement is fairly straightforward. However, where the two marks are not identical, the plaintiff
will have to establish that the allegedly infringing mark so nearly resembles her mark that it is likely to
deceive or cause confusion:' Clearly a confusion or deception requirement is maintained and case
law under the 1958 Act continues to have direct relevance."
(2) The innovation begins with the introduction of additional grounds for infringement to cover
"same or similar" goods while retaining a confusion requirement. Section 29(2) of the Act deals with
sirtations where:
(a) an identical mark used in relation to similar goods;'
(b) a similar mark used in relation to the same or similar goods;42 and
(c) an identical mark used in relation to identical goods."
The last situation is the easiest to dispose of. In such situations, as seen already in Section 29(1), the
courts can safely presume consumer confusion without it having to be proved. However, in both
clauses (a) and (b), the plaintiff will have to prove that use in the course of trade of such a mark is
"likely to cause confusion on the part of the public, or which is likely to have an association with the
registered trade mark." This in turn raises the following questions:
(a) What is meant by a similar mark?
The notion is a familiar one in Indian trademark jurisprudence as various courts have considered the
meaning of -decepovely similar" under the 1958 Act." Thus in Amwitdhamt the perspective from
which to view similarity was that of an "unwary purchaser of average intelligence and imperfect

The same logic will of course apply to services under the new Act. For the purposes of clarity the arguments presented
here are resiricted to goods bue services should be read in wherever appropriate.

In such situations where the marks are not identical, passing off principles may be resorted to. Se, Riuton andd HardqLiwted v. Zarwindara Evginerrag CompaNy, A]. R. 1970 SC. 1649.
For the auihoritative formuladon of
AILR, 1965 SC. 980.

this by

the Supreme Court,

see, DurgaDut

Sharma v. Naturana Pharwmy Labodranes,

See.Section 29(2)(a) of the Act.
See. Section 29(2)(b) of the Act.
See, Section 29(2)(c) of

tie Act.

Specifically mandated in Section 29(3).
fee. Secrion 7d) which defines a mark as being deceptively similar "if it so nearly resembles thar odher mark as to be
likely to deceive or cause confuion".
Annedhar v. Soa Dro, A.I.R.

1963 S.C.

449.
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recollection" and in Hirah447 which contains an instructive summary of the parameters for judging
similarity, "overall similarity", instead of a detailed side-by-side comparison, was regarded as the
touchstone. There is a fairly comprehensive body of case law to draw upon in this regard.'
(b) What is meant by similar goods?
This involves a foray into relatively unknown territory on the Indian trademark map. The 1958 Act
predominandy considered situations where the goods were the same as those specified in the
registration. The usual fallback of drawing upon passing off principles may not be as useful in this
case as the courts have long since abandoned the "commo n field of activity" i.e. a same or similar
goods or services requirement, as a necessary condition for finding infringement." Thus in principle
passing off would equally apply to cases of same, similar and dissimilar goods as long as its
requirements are satisfied although in practise the similarity of goods would make it easier to
establish that a misrepresentation is being made. Bearing these limitations in mind, useful insight may
be gained from the United Kingdom experience, given the similarity of the statutory framework. This
will be taken up in the next section.
(c) What is meant by "likely to have an association"?
Section 29(2) concerns a mark which is "likely to cause confusion on the part of the public, or which
is likely to have an association with the registered trade mark." It appears to present two distinct
possibilities; namely that (a) the use of the mark results in confusion; and (b) the use of the mark
results in an association in the minds of consumers with the registered mark, which does not cause
confusion but should nonetheless be prohibited. Such a reading of the provision, although literally
precise, does not appear to be purposively valid. These two possibilities become more distinct when

compared with the equivalent provision of the Trademark Act 1994 of the United Kingdom" Here
there is infringement where "there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which
includes the likelihood of association with the trade mark." Association is subsumed within
confusion, it must lead to confusion in order to result in infringement and is not a stand alone
ground. This has been elaborated in various United Kingdom" and European' cases.
Additional reassurance may be sought from the similarly worded provisions concerning the relative

grounds for the refusal of registration of a trademark.- Here it appears that wiser counsel prevailed
and registration is refused where "there exists a lkelihood of confusion on the part of the public,

4

Hiraldv.Ganerb, A.I.,R. 1984 Born. 218,220 (Division Bench).

44

For a more detailed understanding, see, Chapter 17 of P NARAYNAN, TiEILAW 0r TRADE
& PASSING On (5" ed., 2000).
The notion of

MARKs

(TRADE MiARK

ACT 1999)

"similar goods" only appeared in Section 39 of the 1958 Act which placed restrictions on assignment or

transfer of marks which would result in a likelihood of confusion.
S'efr

eaomple,

bllra v, Beaars Dars, A 1R 1980 Del- 294,

The equivalent infringement provision is Section 10(2), Trademark Act, 1994Seefor example, Wagomawm Lt v. Cig Cent Restamrants, [1995] R&R 713.

Sbelv.Puma, [1998] R.PC. 199 (E.C.J).
See Section 11(1) of the Act. In trademark jurisprudence there are many parallels between relative grounds for refusal of
registration of a mark (generally in situations where another mark has a better claim) and infringement provisions. Thus,
there is a continuous cross-fertilization of principles between these two areas.
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which includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark." The alternative i.e. mere
association between two marks, regardless of the distinctiveness or repute of the registered mark
resulting in infringement, leads to extremely broad protection being given to even pedestrian and
ordinary marks. Surely this cannot have been the intention.
(3) Finaly, the most expansive protection, specifically against dilution, is introduced in Secnon 29(4)
of the Act which reads as follows:
"A registered trademark is infringed by a person who not being a registered
proprietor or a person using by way of permitted use, uses in the course of trade, a
mark which(a) is identical with or similar to the registered trade mark; and
(b) is used in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which
the trade mark is registered, and
(c) the registered trade mark has a reputation in India and the use of the mark
without due cause takes unfair advantage of or is detrimental to, the distinctive
character or repute of the registered trade mark."
Thus while the mark must be the same or similar to the registered mark, the provision only applies in
cases where the goods are dissimilar. This flows directly from Schechtebs "Rolls-Royce" example
discussed above, highlighting the need to protect the erosion of goodwill by allowing the
indiscriminate use of the same or similar mark on disparate goods and making the link between
theory and practise. In order to determine when goods are dissimilar, it may be helpful to first
determine when goods are similar, as mandated by Section 29(2) and then apply this negatively.
However, the two most intriguing aspects of the provision are found in sub-clause (c). They give rise

to the following questions.
(i) What is meant by a trademark having a "reputation"?
This is a threshold level enquiry in order to activate the protection provided here- Thus it is of critical
importance to determine when a mark would qualify for such strengthened protection and neither the
Act nor the 1958 Act provide any direct guidance as to its meaning When seeking answers to
infringement related questions, courts would naturally look to similarly worded provisions concerning
the relative grounds of refusal for registration of a trademark. However here a surprise awaits them
for although Section 11(2) is otherwise similarly worded, the entity being considered is a "well-known
trade mark"." If such a mark has been registered for, say class 2 products which include paints,
lacquers and varnishes and someone wishes to register the same or a similar mark for class 10 goods
which includes surgical, medical and dental apparatus, she could now be prevented from doing so.,

Section 11(2) reads, "A trade mark which (a) is identical with or similar to an earlier trade mark; and (b) is to be
registered for goods or services which are not similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is registered in the name
of a differenri proprieror shall not be registered if or to the extent die earlier trade mark is a well-known trade mark in
India and the use of the later mark without due cause would rake unfair advantage of or be derinental to the
distinctive character or repute of the earlier trade mark."
" The classes are specified in the Fourth Schedule to the Trade Mark Rules, 2002.
12
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In fact the "well-known trade mark" is well provided for in the Act as far as registration is concerned.
It is defined in Section 2(1)(zg), not only in terms of being known to a "substantial segment" of the
relevant public but an additional requirement is that it must cast such a long shadow that use of such
a mark on other goods and services would imply a connection in the course of trade? The Registrar
is provided with statutory guidelines for making the deteriunation of whether a mark is well-known
or not in Section 11 (6)1 and further guidelines are provided for determining whether a trade mark is
known or recognised by a relevant section of the public in Section 11(7)? Additionally where a trade
mark has been determined to be well-known in at least one relevant section of the public in India by
any court or Registrar, the Registrar shall consider that trade mark as a well-known trade mark for
registration under this Act? Finally, restrictions are placed upon what a Registrar can demand of
such a mark while determining its "well-known" status, such as excluding the requirements that it
should have been registered or used in India" and the Registrar is actively encouraged to bear in
mind the interests of well-known marks during registration and opposition proceedings in general.
Yet despite such benign treatment towards "well-known marks", the statute remains strangely reticent
about the status of a mark with a "reputation" and we must look elsewhere for guidance on this
point. While both concepts have been referred to in passing off cases, there does not appear to be
any dear demarcation between the two and passing off will be examined in greater detail
subsequently in this article. An alternative basis for drawing a distinction may be found in Mostert's
comprehensive and comparative work on the international protection of well-known marks? This
species of mark is not new and was first incorporated into the Paris Convention in 1925." Given the

'

Section

2

(1)(zg) reads, "'Well Known trade mark', in relatian to any goods or services, means an mark which has

become so to the iubsRantial segment of the public which uses such goods or receives such services that the use.

such mark in relation to other goods or services would be likely to be taken as indicating a connection in the course of
trade or rendering of services between those goods or services and a person using the mark in relarion to the firstmentioned goods or services!
Section 11(6) reads, "The Registrar shall, while determinng whether a trade mark is a well-known trade mark, take into
account any fact which he considers relevant for derermining a trade mark as a well-known trade mark incliding (i) the knowledge or recognition of that trade mark in the relevant section of the public including knowledge in India
obtained as a result of promotion of the trade mark;
(ii) the duration. extent and geographical area of any use of that trade mark;
(iii) the duration, extent and geographical area of any promotion of the trade mark, including advertising or publicity

and presentation, at fairs or exhibition of the goods or services to which the trade mark applies;

(iv)the duration and geographical area of any registration of or any application for registration of that trade mark
under this Act ro the extent they reflect the use or recognition of the trade mark;
(%f)the record of successful enforcement of, the rights in that trade mark, in particular, the extend to which the trade

mark has been recognised as a well-known trade mark by any Court or Registrar under that record."
Section 11(7) reads, "The Registrar shall, while determining as to whether a trade mark is known or recognised in a
relevant section of the public for the purposes of sub Section (6), take into account (i) the number of actual or
potential consumers of the goods or services; (ii) the number of persons involved in the channels of distribution of
the goods or services; (ti) the business circles dealing with the goods or services to which that trade mark applies."
See, Section 1118) of whe Act.
This appears to have been done to enable protection for international or foreign marks. See, Section 11(9) of the Act.

See, Section 11(10) of the Act.
F.W MosTn-c, FAMOus

AN

Wriu-KNowa

MArks (1997). (Hereimfrer "MosERl).

* See, Article 6bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 1883. The link to the Pais
Convention as the benchmark is maintained in Articles 16(2) and (3) of TRIPS However, Arncle 6bis is once again
restricted to a "same or similar goods" situation and a requirement as to confusion.
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territorial nature of trademarks, equity demanded that the effort and investment in developing a mark
should be respected despite the fact that it was not protected me registration in a particular
jurisdiction i.e. it tried to establish a trans-border reputation without proving traditional "use" in that
jurisdiction. Such logic is all the more compelling in a globalized world with international media
channels. Various labels have been used for such high-profile marks, such as "famous marks", "wellknown marks" and "marks with a reputation"." Mostert's analysis suggests a descending scale, so that
establishing that a mark is "well-known" would be a higher evidentiary threshold than establishing
that a mark has a "reputation"." According to this understanding it would require detailed evidence
of fame as stipulated by Section 11 above but a lesser evidentiary standard to invoke the same anti
dilution protection for infringement in Section 29. In order to avoid such a result, some guidance may
be obtained from the Trade Mark Rules, 2002. In particular, Rule 48(b)(vi), which specifies what
notices for opposition to registration must contain, appears to equate the concepts of "well-known"
and "reputation".' This appears to be the more favourable approach as detailed guidelines are
provided for determining what qualifies as "well-known" and a higher threshold of fame and
distinctiveness is to be preferred, especially when conferring a strong degree of protection. The mark
C
must be made to earn this broader protection if it detaches itself from a confusion requirement.
(i) What is the harm envisaged in Section 29(4)(c)?
Infringement is triggered here where the "use of the mark without due cause takes unfair advantage
of or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the registered trade mark." Thus there
are four alternatives to be considered, where use of the mark without due cause would:
(a) take unfair advantage of the distinctive character or repute of the earlier trade mark; or
(b) be detrimental to the distinctive character or repute of the earlier trade mark.
As it is a new ground, guidance may be sought from Justice Neuberger's decision in PremierBrandr UK
Ltd v. Tphoon," which was the first to consider infringement under Section 10(3) of the United
Kingdom Act which is the comparable provision to Section 29(4) of the Act. It is to be noted that
while the case discusses at length the interpretation of Section 10(2) and (3), ultimately the plaintiffs
failed on the facts, on both confusion and dilution grounds. The plaintiff markets an extremely wellknown brand of tea - "T.Phoo" - in the United Kingdom and the respondents sought to market
kitchenware hardware under the name "Typhoon". Before specifically considering the nature of the
harm, other useful observations of the court included:

"

"

In Europe the resr for repurtion is thar the earlier mark is known by "a significant part of the public concerned by rhe
productsor goods covered by the Trade mark." ee, Genera lMaors. PlAKn,
[19991 All E.R. (E.C.) 865.
MoritR, sqpra note 63, paragraphs 17-23.
Rule 48(b)(vi) reads, "Where the goods or services in respect of which earlier mark has been registered or applied For or
in respect of which the earlier mark ir ie? knw adltbin he maning of Sub-Section (2) of Section It or has a repatatina within
S
the weanig of that enies the opponenr shall when indicating all the goods or services for which the earlier mark is
protected, also inducaic thoise goods or services on which the opposiion is based" (Emphasis added.)
[20001 FS.R 767-
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"(It does appear to me that dilution is a useful concept to bear in mind when
considering the application of Section 10(3) to a particular set of facts...
However, while dilution is a useful concept to bear in mind, it does not
necessarily follow that every case of infringement under Section 10(3) will
necessarily involve dilution, nor does it follow that the proprietor of a mark
will necessarily succeed in establishing infringement under Section 10(3) in
every case where he establishes dilution.""
"It appears tolerably clear to me from the terms of Section 10, that confusion
is not a necessary ingredient to establishing infringement under Section 10(3).

(a)

(b)

Indeed, this now seems to be established by authority.""
(c)

"Mr Arnold contended that the effect of Section 110(3) was that the stronger
the distinctive character and reputation of a particular mark, the easier it
would be to establish detriment to it. In my judgment, that is a good point.""
"(finally, it is right to mention that... Section 110(3) is not intended to have
the sweeping effect of preventing the use of any sign which is the same, or
similar to, a registered trade mark with a reputation; nor is Section 10(3)
intended to enable the proprietor of a well known registered mark to be able
to object as a matter of course to the use of a sign which may remind people

(d)

of his mark.""
As regards the precise nature of the harm envisaged, the court observed that(a)

The meaning of the phrase "without due cause" was somewhat opaque.
While rejecting the argument that it effectively means "in good faith" or "for
good and honest commercial reasons", the Judge felt that it really represents a
"proviso or exception to the generality of Section 10(3)". In those
circumstances, if an alleged infringer wished to rely on those words, they
must establish that it falls within the exception, rather than the proprietor of
the mark having to establish that the proviso does not apply.
On the facts (e.g. through consumer surveys) the plaintiff did establish an
"association" between the two brands for at least some members of the
public. However these were not sufficient grounds from which to infer harm;
74
there has to be some detriment suffered.

(b)

Dlidat 787.
"

7

lbidat 788. See, in ths regard, Sabely. Para, [1998] RP.C 199, 223- the Advocate-Generali Opinion in Generm/Mworsi
Ypla, [1999] Al E.R. (E.C.) 865, 870 and Brfih Teeowmninhhar PLCv One in a M&n, [1999] FSR 1, 25.
lhidat 789.

2 lAd at 789.
'

1dar 791-92.

Ibidat783

793-98.
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Both the usual suspects i.e. blurring7 and tarnishing " were valid categories
when trying to identify the harm caused to the mark, but were not established
on the facts in this case.

The general impression gained from this and other decisions' is that the existence of dilution is not
to be presumed lightly. Such a pragmatic approach has earlier this year been endorsed by the United
States Supreme Court in its landmark decision in Victor Moseky and Cahy Moseley, dba Victor Little
Seout v. V .Secret Catalogue Inn.," which held that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("PTDA")
required proof of actual dilution of a famoos mark as a prerequisite for relief. This rather revealing
decision resolved a split among the Crcuits as to whether "actual dilution" or a "likelihood of
dilution" was required under the FTDA."
Finally similar grounds are found in Section 29(8) which contemplates infringing use of a mark in
advertising," The Delhi High court has recently considered such a situation in a comparative
advertising interim injunction application under the 1958 Act, between Pepsi and Coke" where it was
squarely alleged that dilution through disparagement and not consumer confusion was the concern."
Pepsi alleged that Coke's commercially disparaged their goods (for example, by referring to a soft
drink called "Pappi") and infringed their trademarks and copyright in the mark Pepsi, the "Globe
Device" and the phrase "Yeb Dil Mang More The court, it is submitted, took a robust view of
modern advertising and rightly rejected such an expansive approach to infringement under the 1958
Act but it remains to be seen how the new provisions will operate" It is always questionable wisdom
ro let trademark law regulate advernising standards too rigidly.

TIbid at 801.
Mbida 798.
-

See for example, Oasis Sares Ltds Tde MarM ApAasd
22, However. in

she latter case

18
9, R.C 631; Baprwtb v. Home Vieo Chand. [19971 SF.R.
a "likelihood of confusion" requirement was read in to Section 10(3) as well and as there

was no confusion, it was held that Section 1101(3)
did not apply. The requirement for confusion, even in dilution
provisions, no longer holds sway. Se, PfporLtd v%Eurofodlink (U Ltd, [2001] ES.R. 17.
65 US.P.Q.2d 1801 (2003). In this case the Famous ingerie brand "Victoria's Secret" had sued the appellants who owned
a shop (intially called Victor's Secret and subsequently changed to Victor's Little Secret) which sold, amongst other
items, adult videos, sex Toys, adult novelacies and men's and women's lingerie.
* Yet this srill begs the question as to what the phrase "causes dilution" really means and how it is sobe proved. The
decision offers only limited guidance in this regard.
Section 29(8) reads, "A registered trade mark is infringed by any advertising of the trade mark if such advertsing (a)takes unfair advantage of and is contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters;
(b)is detrimental to its distinctive character,, or
(c)isagainst the reputation of the trade mark,"
"

Ppei Co v. Hiduaon Coca C/a, LA. No. 3097 of 2001 in Suit No. 635 of 2001. Delhi High cout.

1thidat paragraph 16.
* Some guidance may be had from Section 10(6) of Trade Marks Act 1994 which also regulates comparative advertising
situations; sMe,BrnWrhAimys Pic. Ryanah; [2001] FS.R. 32. However Europe also has a separase compLrative adverising
regime established by Council Directive 97/55, amending Directrve 84/450 concerning misleading advertising So as to

include compararive advertising.
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Fleshing Out the Legislative Skeleton
The new Act shares many underlying principles and even the precise wording of provisions with the
United Kingdom Act of 1994. Thus bearing in mind the caveat that the change of legal context must
always be considered, English authorities often have persuasive value and are regularly cited in Indian
decisions.' This caveat is all the more relevant as much of United Kingdom trademark jurisprudence
is, in turn, influenced by European legislation and interpretative decisions of the European Court of
Justice ("ECJ") in the context of the common market. Thus any such conceptual transplants must
always be modified to suit local needs. Against this backdrop, there are two related developments in
United Kingdom and European Union law which could impact the interpretation of Section 29(4) of
the Act.
(a) What is meant by "dissimilar goods"?
This question was raised in the previous part of this article and an attempt will now be made to
explore the interpretative options available. It is an important phrase as, according to the literal
wording of Section 29(4), the anti-dilution protection in this section only applies to "dissimilar
goods". A useful starting point would be to determine what "similar goods" are. This phrase has a
resonance with "same description of goods" under the 1958 Act" and there appears to be reliance
on English authoritiess which held that "same" was not used to denote "a-replica or exact copy" h
and could thus be extended to "similar" goods as well. Such a comparison between two sets of goods
is always one of fact and the factors to be considered included:"E
(a) The nature and composition of the goods;
(b) Their respective uses and functions; and
(c) The trade channels through which they are bought and sold.
However, the question of whether to compare only the goods in question or to make the assessment
in the context of a "global comparison" regarding the similarity of the marks as well is one which is
still being debated. The former approach was adopted in the Briisb Sugar case" where it was held that
the similarity of goods was a separate issue which must be established before moving on to consider
the likelihood of confusion. The relevant factors in considering similarity were a comparison of the
use, users and physical nature of the plaintiffs and defendant's goods, the way in which they were

sold and the extent to which they were competitive.

The latter approach has been adopted by the

ECJ' and will possibly have an impact in future United Kingdom law. The "global appreciation test"

Se for examph, B4ga v All In&a Reporter, A.I.R. 1969 Born. 302; AwedraN

lame Prodrtam

Corporatio

v

Mac Loboratory

Pdnt*limited,A.R. 1986 S.C 137.
'

SeA Secton 12(1)

which was the corresponding proVision to Section 11 in the new Act.

Section 12(1) of the 1958 Act was based on Seenon 12(1) of the United Kingdom's

Trade

Marks Act 1938.

Daiquid Ram TM, [19691 RPC. 600, 613.
Did at 613, 615, 620.

e aer Robertin &fSamLtd, [1996 RT.PC. 281. (This decision beld that "Silver Spoon Treat" for dessert
Bridrb Sar
sauces and syrups was not similar to "Robertson's Toffee Treat", a sweet spread that was part of a range of Jans and
preserves)

Ibid at 296-297.
Sabel . Puma,, [1997] ECR 1-6191-
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is a direct result of the wording of Recital 10 to the Trade Marks Directive, which lists the factors to
be taken into account in determining a mandatory European standardised approach to likelihood of
confusion. The ECJ has often stared that there is an "interdependence of facrtors'7 such that the
strength of the senior mark can have a bearing on the similarity of the goods, so that goods which
appear, when considered in isolation, to be dissimilar may be treated as similar. It is submitted that the
former approach is the preferable one and could more easily be integrated into pre-existing Indian
jurisprudence.
(b) A possible logical lapse in Section 29?
There has been considerable academic debate' regarding a so-called "logical lapse" within Section 10
of the Trade Marks Act, 1994, to which Section 29 closely corresponds. This lapse has two limbs:
(i) Under Section 10(2), the registered proprietor can sue for infringement where the same or similar
sign is used in relation to the same or similar goods or senices in circumstances where there exists a
likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. The first alleged defect is that this does not cater
for situations where a defendant uses a same or similar mark on dissimilar goods and where there is a
likelihood of confusion. However, in the light of the ECJ's "global appreciation test" discussed above
- where a strong mark can cause goods which would otherwise appear dissimilar to be treated as
similar in the context of determining confusion - this limb does not pose as much of an obstacle as it
once did in the European context In the Indian ltigation arena, as will be demonstrated in a later
part of this article, passing off can fill such a gap as regards confusing use on dissimilar goods. It
remains to be seen how this will evolve in the registered trademark context.
(ii) However, for the purposes of an enquiry into dilution, the second limb of this logical lapse is far
more relevant. Section 10(3) provides for an infringement action to lie where there is use of the
identical or similar sign on disimilargeds or sener, provided that the registered mark has a reputation,
is being used without due cause and its use takes unfair advantage of or is detrimental to the
distinctive character or repute of the registered mark i.e. dissimilar goods are an important
prerequisite to [rigger a dilution remedy. There appears to be no protection against the use of a same
or similar mark which is used on idenical or similargoods absent any likelihood of confusion i.e. in a
"dilution" context. Norman explains that "the risk for the trade mark owner in this latter gap in the
protective wal is the possible genericisation of the mark, such that if a particular name or logo
becomes commonplace in the trade, it is liable to revocation".' The ECJ recently had occasion to
address the issue when considering the scope of the optional Article 5(2) of the Trade Marks
Directive upon which Section 10(3) is based." The court reasoned that Article 5(2) should not be
interpreted solely on the basis of its wording but also in "the light of the overall scheme and

"

ano KKv. Metro-Goldayn-Mawer Inc., [1998] E.CR. I-5507, paragraphs 17-19.
WR. COsNIS,
INTI TCTUALT PROPERTY PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MRKS AND Amen RiG-iTs 727 (4th ed, 1999); A
Michals, Cooaues on asnd about Sent 5(3) and 10(3) of the Trade Markr Ad 1994, E. INTEL. PROP. R. 335 (2000), M_
Spence, Lerarn 1F of the Trade MfarksAt 1994: I then ieal4 a LapalL4sep,
E. b-Ei.. PROP. R. 423 (2001) (hereinafter
"Spence");, H. Norman, Dandof v Gat
Deals nib th Lqp/Ltapie or Creadk Beropee Disarmreeny, 3 1Tr.L P5t' Q

"

342 (2003) (hereinafter "Norman").
Norman, swpra uoe 93, ar 343.

"
'

Daidoff &

ae SA

v Gomid Ltd, [20031 F.S.R. 28.
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objectives of the system of which it (formed) a pare". In view of these objectives, Article 5(2) could
not be given an interpretation which would lead to well-known marks receiving less protection where
the infringing sign was used for identical or similar goods than where it was used for non-simiar
goods. The wel-known mark ought to enjoy protection against its use on identical or similar goods
which was at least as extensive as where it had been used in relation to dissimilar goods or services.
Thus the court has stretched the interpretation well beyond the literal wording of the Directive and
gone against the opinion of the Advocate-General who preferred a more literal interpretation.
Yet a plausible argument is offered by Michael Spence as to why this so-called "gap" in protection
actually makes sense.-He posits that Sections 10(2) and 10(3), "at least on their face... operate in quite
different contexts. Section 10(2) potentially regulates the behaviour of rival traders in the same
market. Section 10(3) potentially regulates the behaviour of traders operating in different markets,"
His justification focuses on the notion of "substitutability" as central to the competitive process.
Products must be allowed to signal that they are substitutable with and can compete against existing
products in the same market segment. By extending the possibility of dilution-level protection to
same or similar products as well, this may cripple a product's ability to do this. Spence argues that:
"(u)anecessarily to restrict a trader's ability to signal substitutability is to create
significant barriers to entry and unfairly to privilege the position of those with an
existing market presence. Provided allusion to existing products does not create
confusion, the trader has a legitimate interest in positioning her product in the
market by reference to existing products.""
Thus any such attempts to extend dilution protection to same or similar products in the context of
Section 29 must respond to such a concern which protects the interests of both legitimate rival
pioducens and consumers who desire a competitive market.

The Possibilities within Passing Off
Norma Dawson has captured the relationship between passing off and the registered trademark
systern vividly in the following phrase- "Alone of the various intellectual property rights, trade marks
enjoy a common law hinterland where many of the principles eventually incorporated in trade mark
legislation have been first developed.""
Even the most casual perusal of the Indian law reports shows that most trademark infringement
actions are twinned with passing off actions as well. The three essential elements, the "classical
trinity", of the action have been identified as:

VDaidoff & Ce LA v Gq~kidL

Spence, sprA

[2002] E.TM.R. 99.

nowe 93, at 426.

"

Spence, rspro note 93, ar 426

*

N. Dawson, Fameos and WeIi-Known Trade Marks -Userping a Cornerof th Giwk Robe, Itro... Panop.

Q. 350,

353 (1998).

Se Reckitt & Co/man v. BordMen, [1990] R.PC. 341, 406; Cowario de/ Promatto di Parma v. Marks & Spencer pk, [1991]
Je,
R.RC. 351, 368; Haredsv. HaraianSchaa, [1996 R.RC. 696, 713. Lord Diplock's more expanded version of the rest
appears to no Ionger be in vogue. For this, see, Eroef Warnink v. Toowmd, [1990] R.P.C. 31, 93.
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goodwill associated with the plaintiff's mark,
a misrepresentation or deception; and
the resultant damage (or the likelihood of damage) to the plaintiff's goodwill or reputation.

However, there are important distinctions between the two. For a registered trademark, the property
that is sought to be protected is an exclusive statutory right whereas passing off is based on property
in goodwill Thus a registered mark infringement action may not require a confusion/deception
element (e.g. an identical mark on identical goods or in dilution situations) but deception and
misrepresentation lie at the heart of passing off."' On the one hand passing off is wider and more
flexiblc, giving protection to all the means by which the claimant's trade or goods may be identified
with her, and not just those which she has managed to get registered. Nevertheless, it is also more
onerous, in the sense that the claimant must prove her reputation and that the defendant's activities
involve a false representation damaging to the claimant's goodwill. Despite these additional
evidentiary requirements, passing off has evolved to provide effective protection against dilution,
particularly in the context of well-known marks. When looking at these developments from a dilution
oriented perspective, three trends become apparent;
(1) The notion of a separate category of well-known marks arose initially from the need to establish a
trans-border reputation in a particular jurisdiction when there may not have been an actual business
establishment or trademark use in the traditional sense in that jurisdiction. This allowed hurdles in
proving goodwill in that jurisdiction to be overcome, if that mark was sufficiently famous and this
would help satisfy the first element of the "classical trinity" The Indian courts have rejected the logic
that in order to succeed in passing off, the plaintffs must prove that business activities are carried out
in that jurisdiction'" and the presence of a reputation in India is sufficient to generate goodwill.
Additionally, the courts have developed various criteria for recognising well known marks which
could usefully supplement the criteria discussed above in the context of Section 11(6) and (7)i'03
(2) The courts have accepted that for well-known marks, erosion of distinctiveness i.e. a form of
dilution, is a genus of damage which can be considered under the third limb of the passing off test.
The Wilam Grant Scotch whisky decision of the Delhi High court," which refers to Taininger " is
the authority for this proposition."

n The authoritative acknowledgment of the differences between the two types of actions is found in D'rg Det v.
Navaratna Phrmandeds,A.I.R. 1965 S.C 980, 990.
INTELL. PRoP. L. Rv. 63; Cakin Klei Inc v. Internadonai
AppardSyndicate, [19951 FSR. 515. This was ilho a consideration in Appe Compaer v.Apple Leasing [1993] INTn.L. PROP.
L Rev. 63.

SSee, Sarch Widsky Assedahon v. Moban Mkrn Ltd., (1993) 18

For a scholarly and succinct summary, sew, R Anand, India.
305.
" WrimwGrant dSons Lid v. McDowell&
'

"m

Tazilzery.AbI&,

Fll-Knowe

Trade Marks m MosTa-r,

srpra note

63, at 303,

CC,[1994] FS K 690.

supra n cte28.

Other English authoriies which as consider the erosion of discincEiveness include Vie Products v. MacKen/ie, [1969]
RPC 1;
l&dngerv Costa Brava, [1961] RRC; 116;
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(3) Finally well-known trademarks have been protected even in relation to dissimilar goods. In the
Ben,7 case,i'l the defendants were restrained from using the mark "Benz" on undergarments despite.
the minimal likelihood of confusion between such products and high quality automobiles. More
recently, in the Honda decision, m the well-known Japanese car and motorcycle giant successfully
prevented the defendants from using "Honda" on their pressure cookers. The argument that the
goods were neither allied nor cognate was rejected in the light of the evolution of the tort of passing
off to cover dilution situations as well, where the harm was no longer restricted to confusion in the
case of the same or similar goods."'
While these developments trace the progression of passing off to keep pace with the needs of traders
and show that it can conceptually encompass dilution as a recognised type of damage, at the same
time it must be remembered that the element of misrepresentation also lies at its heart. It has not yet
developed into a free-floating tort of unfair competition which prevents any sort of
misappropriation. This anchoring was reassuringly evident in the recent Cricket World Cup "ambush
marketing" case. 1 The plaintiffs were a company set up to own and control all commercial rights
relating to International Cricket Council events including the World Cup. The second defendant
Philips had launched an advertising campaign offering Cricket World Cup tickets as prizes, using the
slogans "Philips: Diwali Manao World Cup Jao" and "Buy a Philips Audio System win a ticket to the
World Cup", as well as inserting a pictorial representation of a ticket with an imaginative seat and gate
number saying "Cricket World Cup 2003" in the advertisement- It was alleged inter aia that the
defendants were misrepresenting their association with the plaintiff and the World Cup, by
advertisements in the media and by using these slogans with the intention to unlawfully derive the
commercial benefit of association with the plaintiff and the World Cup, thereby seeking to piggyback
on the reputation of the plaintiff. It was further pleaded that the defendants' actions were guided by
the sole intent of damaging the reputation of the plaintiff and the authorised sponsors of the event,
who were engaged in the same line of business as the defendants. It was also pleaded that the
defendants resorted to "ambush marketing" to take advantage of the World Cup without investing a
single rupee towards its success.
Factors which the court considered were the generic nature of the term "World Cup""' and the
strong likelihood that viewers would not be confused into thinking that the defendants were sponsors
of licensees of the event."' There was also no deceit or misrepresentation involved in "ambush
marketing" (a term relegated back to the advertising world whence it came from), which meant that
the conditions for passing off could not be satisfied.?" Finally such use of terms like "Cricket World

Daimler BenZAkenasel/scbafliv. Hybo Hindetan, A.R. 1984 Del. 239.

Honda Motorsv. CharanjitSigb & Ors., IA No. 12971 /00 in S. No. 2785/00 Delhi High court.
Ibid at paragraphs 23, 24.
ICC Development (Internonal)v. Arne Enterpnes, IA Na 9854/2002 in Suit No. 1710/2002 Delhi High court.
(Hereinafter "ICC Devlopment v. Arne Enterprises").
Ibid at paragraphs 4, 18.

na

Ibid at paragraph 9.

"' Ibid at paragraph 10.
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Cup" would be well within the ambit of descriptive or fair use."' Reading between the lines one is led
to the conclusion that mere association does not qualify as dilution - specific harm to a mark needs
to be established. Thus the ad-interim relief was not granted in this case.
Not a Conclusion
The new Trademarks Act of 1999 was introduced without any real legislative deliberation regarding
tne parameters or consequences of such expanded infringement."' The purpose of this article has
been to attempt to frame the debate, keeping in mind existing Indian trademark jurisprudence,
highlighting underlying policy issues and identifying possible reference points drawn from a
comparative analysis. In the process the arguments have eschewed an ivory tower approach as to
whether dilution ought to be incorporated into trademark law at all - the challenge is to work with the
law as it currently exists.
The author is well aware of Indian market realities and the widespread prevalence of counterfeit and
spurious products. Pharmaceutical products are a compelling example of the need for an effective
trademark law to act as a filter against fakes."' However consumer confusion as a ground for
infringement would amply serve the interests of both brand owners and consumers in this regard.
The normative stance adopted in this article, which advocates caution, results from the dilution
doctrine separating itself from any requirement whatsoever for consumer confusion as the basis for
infringement. This has implications not only for brand-owning producers and consumers, the
traditional subjects of trademark policy, but also for competitors and the interest of the general
public in preserving the public domain in terms of speech and language."' Such a concern is not
restricted to the realms of academic debate."' In fact the "ambush marketing" case discussed above
specifically considered the commercial speech implications in its passing off decision."'
Intellectual property, as a body of doctrinal knowledge, must increasingly acknowledge that human
innovation builds on previous works. This article is itself built largely around the pronouncements of
judges and commentators and if imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, the new Trade Mark Act
sincerely flatters the United Kingdom Act of 1994. Thus a blanket ban on all references and all so
called "free riding" should not be invoked. In some of the cases discussed above, it is possible to

"'

Ibid at paragraph 18.

"s

The relevant Parliamentary Debaces are available at http://wwwparliamlentnfindiainic-in/ldeb/Isdeb.htm (visited on
November 1, 2003), Far more emphasis appears to have been placed on geographical indications related concerns in the
Trademark 3ill rather than subs tantive trademark law issues.
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See for exampk, IndiYd Trade in Fake Dmgs - Binging the Coantorfeiers to Book, http://wwwessentialdru)s-orefedrugf
archive/200106/msg00048.php (visited on June 2, 2001); Pharma Cos Plan Awarness Camapagn against Fake Drugs,
BusiNsss LiNE, August 18, 2003 at 4; 1 in 4 Tablet trohaSpasoas: Industry, THE TEILGRAPH, August 5, 2003 at 7.
For an interesting account of the potential proprietary reach of trademarks into common parlance, see, M.H.
Goldhaber, Language as a Public Good Under Threat The Priae Ownersbrb of Brand Names, in NOT ran SALE: IN DrisEi oF
Piwic GooDs 323 (A. Anion et a]. eds., 2000)

United States

law

is quite famillar with trademark rights running up against free speech concerns, the case involving

Barbie being a recenr example. See, Mattellavcv MCA Records Inc., 28 r Supp. 2d 1120 (1998).
"'

ICC Drlopamenty, Arr

Fnterpriss, seepra note 110, at paragraph 10,

22

DibiedMarks
intitively feel that dilution is chipping away at the distibcriveness of a brand. However, courts are
uncomfortable with intuition. In cases of passing of( the requirements of proving goodwill and
establishing a misrepresentation ensure that the action is nor allowed to expand unchecked. Despite
the best efforts of its proponents," such clear and accepted guidelines do not yet exist for dilution in
a registered trademarks context For the Indian judiciary, the challenge now is to find the appropriate
balance when establishing these standards.

For an excellent overview of diluion theory and an argument in favour of dilution based on cognitive consumer

psychology, seeJ.B. Swann, Dilion Redefsedfor ihe ear 2002, 92 T.M.R. 585 (2002).
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